Government motivation-embedded return guarantee for urban infrastructure projects based on real options by Man, Qingpeng et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Man, Qingpeng, Sun, Chengshuang, Fei, Yuesheng, Skitmore, Martin, Bai,
Yong, & Lu, Weizhuo
(2016)
Government motivation-embedded return guarantee for urban infrastruc-
ture projects based on real options.
Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 22(7), pp. 954-966.
This file was downloaded from: https://eprints.qut.edu.au/97920/
c© 2016 Vilnius Gediminas Technical University (VGTU) Press
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
https://doi.org/10.3846/13923730.2016.1204362
  
GOVERNMENT MOTIVATION-EMBEDDED RETURN GUARANTEE FOR URBAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BASED ON REAL OPTIONS 
QingpengMana, ChengshuangSunb, YueshengFeic, Martin Skitmored, Yong Baie, WeizhuoLuf 
 a School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, 92 Xidazhi Street, Harbin, 15001, China. Email: 
manqp@126.com. 
b School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, 92 Xidazhi Street, Harbin, 15001, China. Email: 
chshsun@hit.edu.cn. 
c YueshengFei, Industrial Securities Co.,Ltd, 15 Jinrong St, Xicheng, Beijing, 100034, China. 
Email:yuesheng_fei@126.com.  
d School of Civil Engineering and Built Environment, Queensland University of Technology, Gardens Point, 
Brisbane,Q4001, Australia. Email:rm.skitmore@qut.edu.au.  
e  Department of Construction Management and Engineering, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND 58102-6050, 
USA. Email: yong.bai@ndsu.edu. 
f  Construction Engineering and Management, Department of Civil, Environmental and Natural Resources Engineering, 
Luleå University of Technology, 97187, Luleå, Sweden. Email:weizhuo.lu@ltu.se. 
Received and accepted dates () 
Abstract. Governments usually guarantee the amount of investment income to private sector partners to encourage their 
participation in Public-Private Partnership urban infrastructure development projects, with the ‘float return on investment 
guarantee’ being the main method in use by the Chinese government today. The current problems with the float return on 
investment guarantee are analysed and a guarantee approach with embedded motivational behaviour is presented as an 
alternative. A pricing method option is then introduced as the motivation-embedded return guarantee has similar characteristics 
to real options. From this, a valuation model is developed that provides the basis of a new systematic method for calculating 
the government guarantee value. 
Keywords: Urban infrastructure, government guarantee, real options, motivation behaviour. 
Introduction 
For a long time, much needed infrastructure development in developing countries and emerging markets has been greatly 
restricted due to lack of finance (Chen, 2002), and China is no exception (Pan, Ma, 2007). Since the mid-1990s, Chinese 
urbanisation has developed rapidly, growing at around one per cent per year. By the end of 2012, China’s urban population 
had accounted for over 52 per cent of the county’s total population (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013), with 
approximately 71 million city dwellers. As a result, the social demand for urban infrastructure has increased rapidly and it is 
predicted that the aggregate investment needed in Chinese urban infrastructure from 2011 to 2015 will be between 20 trillion 
and 36 trillion RMB (Beilin, 2013) (1 US D=6.1895RMB in December 2014). The debt caused by urban infrastructure 
projects by 2010, however, was estimated to be 86.5 per cent of all of Chinese local government debts, with 79.01 per cent of 
that being in bank loans (National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). This suggests that government 
financial support alone is unlikely to be sufficient to meet the demands on China’s urban infrastructure capital. Some external 
contribution is therefore needed, making it necessary to attract foreign capital and domestic non-government capital. An 
increasingly popular approach to this is through the collaboration of local governments and private investors by Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) such as BOT, TOT, PFI, DBFO (Ham, Koppenjan, 2002) 
Urban infrastructure projects also have long construction and operation periods that involve many risks in their financing, 
construction, operation and maintenance (Grimsey, Lewis, 2002; Ahwireng-Obeng, Mokgohlwa, 2002), and PPPs provide a 
structured collaboration model for risks, costs and income to be shared or reassigned by the public sector and private investors 
by using long-term contracts (Lehman, Tregoning, 2004). In doing this, and in order to attract foreign and domestic non-
government capital, China’s host governments provide a guaranteed minimum return on investment (ROI) to private investors 
to reduce their risk and encourage their involvement (Ceran, 2002; Fan, Xiao, 2003). 
The prospects of obtaining at least a reasonable return is an essential prerequisite to motivate investors, but profit may be 
acquired through monopoly management of investors due to the monopolistic nature of urban infrastructure. It is therefore 
necessary for the government to restrict investors’ income caused by a monopolistic situation. The government has the right to 
share high-expected project returns. To do this in PPPs in China, in addition to setting a minimum ROI for the private 
investor, the local government sets a maximum ROI too. 
These ROI guarantees provided by the Chinese government embody three aspects: concessionary management, ROI and 
investment climate (Feng and Ju, 2008; Luo, 2008; Wang et al., 2008). The minimum ROI guarantee, in particular, is very 
important for private investors and the most effective in attracting non-government capital investors (Guo et al., 2011; Sun et 
al., 2007; Xia, Li, 2009). A fixed ROI guarantee or disguised fixed ROI is banned by the central Chinese government (State 
  
Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China, et al., 1995; Ministry of Construction of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2005; National Development and Reform Commission of China, et al., 2015), so the ROI of urban infrastructure 
projects in China can only be the float ROI method. This means that the local government reaches an agreement with project 
company on the upper and lower limits of their ROI (Li-na, 2004). When the actual ROI is beyond the upper limit, the income 
caused by the extra ROI is taken by the government as revenue, but all the income goes to the project company when the 
actual ROI is below the upper limit and the government compensates the project company when it is below the lower limit. 
The method does create motivational problems though, as the compensation provided to underperforming companies with 
low actual ROIs offers little incentive to improve.  Similarly, the cap on high ROIs provides no incentive to perform any 
higher.  This paper presents a return guarantee approach with embedded motivational behaviour aimed at correcting this 
situation.  With this approach, project company earning below the set minimum ROI are reimbursed if this is due to 
government policy, while those earning above the set maximum ROI are provided with an inducement (such as a tax break) to 
continue doing so. Because this approach has two threshold mechanisms, this paper studies this form of government 
motivation-embedded return guarantee based on barrier option theory. 
1. Literature Review  
Early studies of government guarantees began with the free cash flow (FCF) method.  Its main defect, however, is an inability 
to capture the flexibility of project management and strategic interaction, which has been gradually exposed with the 
development of risk management theory. Hayes and Garvin (1982) realized that, when the discounted cash flow (DCF) 
method was used to analyse projects containing great uncertainties, it can underestimate investment opportunity - leading to 
shortsighted decision-making or underinvestment. Myers (1990), who first proposed the adjusted present value (APV) 
approach, observed that the DCF method had inherent limitations when it was used to evaluate strategic management options 
or huge investment risks. Both the DCF and APV methods are developed from the FCF method and they can therefore be 
classified as FCF-based methods. FCF-based methods have special characteristics in pricing guarantee values. The first is 
typically considering invest processes as reversible. This means the investments could be recouped if actual profit is lower 
than anticipated profit. But the facts, however, indicate that most investments are irreversible (Eschenbach et al., 2007). The 
second characteristic is supposing there is only one chance to make an investment decision and the investment opportunity 
cannot be postponed. This means that investment decision makers are only passive selectors and cannot change their decisions 
in the project life time. There are, however, many opportunities to make or change decisions in the project life time (Han and 
Park., 2008). If decision makers are uncertain about the project foreground, they can postpone the investment until they obtain 
more information to make decisions for next stage. FCF-based methods neglect the time or chance selectivity of investment 
decisions. The third characteristic of FCF-based methods is accurately forecasted of net cash flows. One of their important 
prerequisites is that net cash flows at each time point can be forecasted accurately. In an uncertain investment environment, 
net cash flows are hard to calculate accurately. FCF-based methods neglect the uncertainty of projects. Because of these 
characteristics, FCF-based methods work well for a short-term project, but may lead an incorrect decision with a long-term 
project. Urban infrastructure projects always have long-term life cycle with different stages, uncertainties and high risks and 
are therefore unsuitable for FCF-based methods. As Myers (1990) points out, the option method has an obvious potential for 
use with long-term, uncertain projects. 
The first application of the option method in the value of guarantees was by Merton (1977), who evaluated loan guarantees 
provided by the U.S. government. Real options (ROs) methods have been developed as option methods sometimes do not 
work well when guaranteed subjects have no real trades and their prices are discrete. Jones and Mason (1980) have 
constructed a value equation for loan guarantees using a ROs method from the perspective of government guarantees for an 
enterprise’s preferred debt and junior debt in the belief that the fiscal cost of government could be reduced through regulating 
the proportion of these two types of debt. From the perspective of an infrastructure concessions contract, Lin (2000) 
theoretically optimised the guarantee contracts on ROI and government incomes and derived a formula to determine a 
reasonable level of government guarantees. Zhang (1999) calculated the value of the full guarantee, partial guarantee and debt 
guarantee using the real option method. Gao and Guo (2007) suggested that government guarantees for urban infrastructure 
are a type of down-and-input option and devised a valuation model using barrier option theory. Zhang and Guo (2006) 
established a value model for government guarantees for float ROI and purchasing agreements. These studies examined the 
pricing of government guarantees from different perspectives and assume the guarantee period to be equated with the 
concession period. However, concessionaires cannot settle with the government until the end of the concessionary period, 
which means the government guarantees are executed many times during the concession period. In China, guarantees are 
always executed annually, based on demand quantity or return. Considering the characteristics of the float ROI, this paper 
takes the time node when ROI reaches the upper/lower limit designated in the contract as the execution time of guarantees, as 
shown in Figure 1. Thus, construction times are reduced; effectively motivating increased investor enthusiasm and business 
creativity, so the level of guarantees can be reduced accordingly. Hence, government financial risk is also reduced (Li, et al., 
2011). 
  
 
Fig. 1. Float return guarantee 
In Figure 1, the solid line indicates the actual ROI of the project company, R1and R2 indicate the lower and upper limits of 
ROI respectively, such that the ROI is never less thanR1and never more than R2, with the government making up any deficit 
belowR1 in time [0,T1] and extracting any surplus above R2 in time [T2,T3]. 
1.  Float ROI changes the expected return of investors and redistributes project risk through adjusting the 
upper and lower returns of investment. If the range of float ROIs could not be properly controlled, the 
government would have a contingent liability. Although the liability is not paid immediately, there is still an 
estimated liability for the government. If the ROI lower limit (R1) is set too high and cannot match the 
government’s ability to pay, the government will face considerable financial pressure (Andreas, 2004; 
Houskamp, 2000; Mody and Patro, 1996). 
2.  Non-government investors inevitably require increases of R2 (Robert, 1997). If the R2 is too high for the 
project company to achieve, the government loses control of the guarantee. However, if the R2 is low, the 
non-government investors have less incentive to invest. 
3.  An underperforming project company may just settle for R1 and continue to underperform, which increases 
financial pressure on the government (Alonso-Conde, 1997; Modya, Lewis, 1997). 
4.  Parting with the surplus above R2disincentivises the project company to seek a ROI above R2. The project 
company may even keep the actual return lower than R2 by increasing cost or other ways that cause 
unnecessary waste, reduce operational efficiency, and affect the quality of urban infrastructure provision 
(Zhang, Guo, 2009). 
In this paper, we propose a motivation-embedded ROI guarantee method aimed at solving these problems. With this new 
approach, the project company is compensated for an ROI>0 below R1 only if it is due to government policy, otherwise the 
company must carry its own losses.  In addition, when the ROI exceeds R2, the government motivates the project company to 
some extent, such as by a reduced amount of taxation on the company’s general revenue. 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Theory selection  
ROs have three typical characteristics of being uncertain, time-selective and irreversible (Wong, 2007). With the government 
granting franchise rights to project company, urban infrastructure projects also have these three typical characteristics. After 
the first phase franchise, if the products or services provided by project company meet the requirements of the government, 
the project company will have the right to decide whether to continue the franchise rights after they forecast future market 
changes. Future market changes involve the uncertain selection of franchise rights representing time-selection. If the project 
company decide to continue the franchise and renew the contract with the government, it will continue to invest in urban 
infrastructure projects. This is because, with the long operation period involved, most of the investment results in fixed assets 
that have low fluidity and all or part of the investment is irreversible. 
Under such uncertain conditions, the government’s franchise guarantee is a growth option which is one kind of real options. 
When the first franchise right expires and the production or services provided by the project company meet the government’s 
requirements, the project company has the option of the franchise right for a limited period.  If the project company forecast a 
profit, their preference is to exercise the option as it is a growth option (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998). This option causes 
asymmetry in the gains and losses of the project company. If the uncertainties are conducive to a positive direction, the project 
company will exercise the option to obtain greater benefits. Otherwise, the project company will abandon the option to avoid 
making a greater loss. The government guarantee can provide future investment opportunities for the project company. This is 
of great significance to project company (Chiara et al., 2007). Therefore, we use growth option theory to study the 
government guarantee.   
2.2 Description of value changes 
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Geometric Brownian motion is a special Markov process and is widely used to describe security prices in standard finance 
theory. Although there are some limitations, empirical studies show that geometric Brownian motion can describe project 
prices changes well between 70 to 80 years (Luenberger, 1998; Jing et al. 2012). Both project value and project price are 
identically distributed over a long period, as project value is a result of the mean reversion of project price over time. Because 
of the long period of time taken in the construction and operation of urban infrastructure projects, the difference between the 
mean reversion results of projects prices and projects values is only marginal. More importantly, geometric Brownian motion 
can provide an analytical solution that can be used to determine the effects on real option values and government guarantee 
decisions caused by uncertainties (Mulvey et al., 1997). 
Geometric Brownian motion can be expressed by: 
 ݀ݔሺݐሻ ൌ ܽ݀ݐ ൅ ܾ݀ݖ (1) 
where a and b are constants. 
The drift rate and variance rate are assumed to be constant in geometric Brownian motion. These two rates in the value change 
process are functions of time t so that, according to the ITO process: 
 ݀ݔ ൌ ܽሺݔ, ݐሻ݀ݐ ൅ ܾሺݔ, ݐሻ݀ݖ (2) 
where the drift rate of x is a and the variance rate of a isb2. 
According to the ITO theorem, the value, V, is a function of time t, from the following procedure: 
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where the drift rate of V is (డ௏డ௫ ܽ ൅
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డ௫ሻଶܾଶ). This is used to calculate project 
value.  
2.3 Pricing Model 
Project value P follows geometric Brownian motion and therefore 
 ௗ௉௉ ൌ ߤ݀ݐ ൅ ߪ݀ݖ (4) 
where P is the project value, µ is the expected rate of return of the project; σ is the variance of the expected rate of return, 
which represents the uncertainty of the return, and dz is a random disturbance term. 
From (3), the growth option of project F is 
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The discrete forms of (4) and (5) are 
 ∆ܲ ൌ ߤܲ ൅ ߪܲ∆ݐ (6) 
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where dz and ∆ݖ are random disturbance terms. 
To remove the random disturbance term and construct a risk-free investment portfolio, a risk investment portfolio Π is 
constructed with government guarantee F and project value P: 
 Π=-F+ డிడ௉ ܲ (8) 
After ∆ݐ time, the risk investment portfolio is: 
 ∆Π=-∆F+ డிడ௉ ∆ܲ (9) 
Substituting (6) and (7) into (9): 
 ∆Π=(- డிడ௧ -
ଵ
ଶ
డమி
డ௉మ ߪଶܲଶ)∆t (10) 
There is no random disturbance term ∆ݖ in (4) and hence after ∆ݐ time the Π must be a risk-free investment portfolio:  
 ΔΠ ൌ ݎΠΔݐ(11) 
where r is the risk-free interest rate. 
Substituting (8) and (9) into (11): 
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After transformation,(12) can be expressed by:  
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which is the celebrated Black-Scholes equation (Black, Scholes, 1973). According to the basic theory of ROs (Black and 
Scholes, 1973), the expected value of the growth option on the expiry date ismax	ሺ ்ܲ െ ܥ, 0ሻ, where ்ܲ is the project value 
on the expiry date and C is the initial investment cost. After solving (13), the pricing equation is: 
 ܨ ൌ ܲܰሺ݀ଵሻ െ ܥ݁ି௥்ܰሺ݀ଶሻ (14) 
where: 
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and ܰሺݔሻis the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
2.4 ROI changes 
Urban infrastructure provides basic services and the general foundation of the urban economy, social development and 
people’s lives. It is the primary condition for city survival and development and the material basis of urban economic 
development (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China, 1999). The service/production price of urban 
infrastructure has a direct impact on the economics of local government and local government has the right and ability to keep 
control of the price (Strak, 1974). As mentioned in Tam’s study (1999), project companies have little chance of adjusting 
price when in the process of negotiation or operation. The Chinese government has developed a series of laws and regulations 
to prevent project companies acquiring huge profits. These laws and regulations can be divided into three levels. The top-level 
laws are the Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of 
China, 2007) and the Pricing Law of the People's Republic of China (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
of China, 1997), which stipulates that infrastructure service/production must be priced by government. Project companies 
have the right to advise on the price but this must within a reasonable range of the government guidance price. The second 
level regulations comprise the Measures Concerning Curbing the Making of Exorbitant Profits (State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, 2011) and Prohibition of Acts of Price Monopoly Tentative Provisions (National Development and 
Reform Commission of China, 2003).  These stipulate that the profits for infrastructure service/production must within a 
reasonable range of the average profits made in the same region, at the same time and with the grade. Based on these two 
regulations, every province in China has guidance prices for different regions. The third level regulations consist of the 
Financial Guideline for Government and Public-Private Partnership (Ministry of Finance of China, 2015) and Guideline on 
Carrying out Public-Private-Partnership (National Development and Reform Commission of China, 2014), which stipulate 
that the profit rates for infrastructure service/production should be based on the medium and long term lending rates of 
commercial banks. Therefore, all project companies in China have profit rates that are within the range of the government 
guidelines and it is not possible for them to make any huge profits. As a result, this study makes the assumption that project 
ROI is always lower than the upper limit of ROI. This simplifies the boundary condition for the government guarantee value 
model and reflects the reality of the situation.  
3. Model Construction 
Suppose the loss of the project company is caused by government policy, the return level of the project company during 
concessionary time is lower than the secondary threshold R’. This is shown in Figure 2, where the solid line indicates the 
actual ROI of the project company. Supposing the motivation threshold value isR0; the government motivation level is R+; and 
R* is the actual ROI after motivation, so R*=R+ R+, where 0<R0<1, 0<R+<1, R>R0. 
 
Fig.2. Motivation-embedded ROI guarantee 
When the project company is in time interval [0, T1), the actual ROI of the project company is less than 0, which means that 
the project company is operating at loss due to the public welfare policy of the government. In this case, the government 
subsidises the project company to assure its received ROI is at least 0. In time interval [T1, T2), the ROI is between 0 and 
R0and the project company obtains the actual ROI. In time interval [T2, T3), as the actual ROI of the project company is more 
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than the threshold value-R0, the government should provide some motivation (e.g. tax preference) to give the project company 
additional R+ ROI so the project company receives a final ROI of R* (R*=R+ R+).  In this way, the project company is 
incentivised to make a high actual ROI and avoid making a low actual ROI without the possibility of making a loss or huge 
profit. 
3.1. Model Description 
The government guarantee value is a function of project income V, and time t, F (V, t) is the government guarantee value with 
embedded motivational behaviour. F (V, t) can be expressed as: 
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Supposing the project return V conforms to geometric Brownian motion, then: 
 dzdt
V
dV    (16) 
where V is the project return, μ is the expected return on project investment, and σ is the variance of expected return, which 
represents the uncertainty of the expected return. Supposing F is some call option of the project, F is the function of V and t 
and satisfies the Black-Scholes equation according to the ITO theorem: 
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Considering the boundary conditions, the government guarantee of investment has the following option characteristics: 
1. When the project return is in interval [ܸܴെ , 0], the project company actually obtains a put option, which comes into 
effect when V =0 and becomes invalid when V reaches ܸܴെ . 
2. When the project return V reaches	ܸܴ0 , supposing the project company cannot obtain huge profits (meaning the 
project return cannot reach	ܸܴ′), the project company actually obtains a call option. 
If the government provides embedded motivational behaviour guarantees for a project with M years of concessionary time, 
there will be many European call and put options during the concessionary time - even though the government only signs one 
contract with the project company - because of the guarantee of annual fulfilment. European options and American options 
are two main styles of options. A European option may be exercised only at the expiration date of the option, while an 
American option may be exercised at any time before the expiration date. Because the project company will make a choice to 
exercise or not to exercise the option at the end of each fiscal year, the options are European-style options. 
V is the current value of the urban infrastructure project return, and I is the initial investment, then the value of the put option 
obtained by the project company is: 
 
1 max( , 0)F V   (18) 
where –V means the project company is operating at a loss due to the public welfare policy of the government. 
The value of call option is then: 
 )0,max(
2 VF   (19) 
3.2. Solution of the Put Option 
ܨ∗ሺܸ, ݐሻ	is the standard put option value, which will become invalid when V reaches  ܸܴെ . When  ܸ ൌ ோܸష the boundary 
condition is: 
  
 ( , ) 0RF V t   (20) 
Solving the following model in region { ܸܴെ ൑ ܸ ൑ ܸܴ0，0൑ ݐ ൑ ܶ }: 
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Let    , ,G U t F V t ,U V  , then: 
 ܩሺܷ, ݐሻ ൌ ܫ݁ି௥ሺ்ି௧ሻሾܰሺ݀ଶሻ െ ൬െ ௎௏ೃష൰
ିమೝ഑మାଵ ܰሺ݀ସሻሿ െ ܷሾሺ݀ଵሻ െ ൬െ ௎௏ೃష൰
ିమೝ഑మାଵ ܰሺ݀ଷሻ ሿ (22) 
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Substituting ܷ ൌ െܸ in equation, 
 ܨሺܸ, ݐሻ ൌ ܩሺܷ, ݐሻ ൌ ܫ݁ି௥ሺ்ି௧ሻሾܰሺ݀ଶሻ െ ൬െ ௎௏ೃష൰
ିమೝ഑మାଵ ܰሺ݀ସሻሿ െ ܷሾܰሺ݀ଵሻ െ ൬െ ௎௏ೃష൰
ିమೝ഑మାଵ ܰሺ݀ଷሻሿ 
															ൌ ܫ݁ି௥ሺ்ି௧ሻሾܰ݀଺ െ ൬ ௏௏ೃష൰
ିమೝ഑మାଵ ܰሺ଼݀ሻሿ ൅ ܸሾܰሺ݀ହሻ െ ൬ ௏௏ೃషሻ
ିమೝ഑మାଵܰሺ݀଻ሻ൨ (23) 
where  ݀ହ ൌ ୪୬ቀି
಺
ೇቁିሺ௥ା
഑మ
మ ሻሺ்ି௧ሻ
ఙ√்ି௧ , ݀଺ ൌ ݀ହ ൅ ߪ√ܶ െ ݐ, ݀଻ ൌ
୪୬൭ି ೇ∗಺ೇೃషమ
൱ିሺ௥ା഑మమ ሻሺ்ି௧ሻ
ఙ√்ି௧ , ݀8 ൌ ݀7 ൅ ߪ√ܶ െ ݐ. 
Equation (23) is the solution of the put option value obtained by the project company. 
3.3. Solution of the Call Option 
When the return of the project company exceeds	ܸܴ0 , the project company will gain government motivation λV. At the 
expiration date of the option, the call option value is ܨ2 ൌ max	ሺߣܸ, 0ሻ. 
Considering the boundary condition and supposing the project company cannot obtain huge profits, after correction for the 
initial current value V0, the call option value obtained by the project company is a standard call option. Solving the following 
model in region ሼܸ ൒ ோܸబ, 0 ൑ ݐ ൑ ܶሽ: 
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

                  (24) 
After solving equation (24), the call option value is: 
 ܨሺܸ, ݐሻ ൌ ߣܸܰሺ݀ଵሻ (25) 
where݀ଵ ൌ ௫√ଶఛ ൅
ଵ
ଶ ሺܭ ൅ 1ሻ√2߬ ൌ
୪୬௏ାሺ௥ାభమఙమሻሺ்ି௧ሻ
ఙ√்ି௧  
3.4. Comprehensive Option Value  
At every expiration date of the option, the government guarantee value with embedded motivational behaviour isF1, F2, or 0 
for the project company. The project company will exercise a call option or put option according to actual return. The put 
option value at each expiry date is: 
 ܨଵ ൌ ܫ݁ି௥ሺ்ି௧ሻሾܰሺ݀ଶሻ െ ൬ ௏௏ೃష൰
ିమೝ഑మାଵ ܰሺ݀ସሻሿ ൅ ܸሾܰሺ݀ଵሻ െ ௏௏ೃష
ିమೝ഑మାଵ ܰሺ݀ଷሻሿ (26) 
  
where ݀1 ൌ
lnቀെܫܸቁെሺݎ൅
ߪ2
2 ሻሺܶെݐሻ
ߪ√ܶെݐ  ,݀2 ൌ ݀1 ൅ ߪ√ܶ െ ݐ,݀3 ൌ
lnቆെ ܸ∗ܫܸܴെ2
ቇെሺݎ൅ߪ22 ሻሺܶെݐሻ
ߪ√ܶെݐ , ݀ସ ൌ ݀ଷ ൅ ߪ√ܶ െ ݐ 
The call option value at each expiry date is: 
 ܨ2 ൌ ߣܸܰሺ݀1ሻ (27) 
wheredଵ ൌ ୶√ଶτ൅
ଵ
ଶ ሺK ൅ 1ሻ√2τ ൌ
୪୬୚ାቀ୰ାభమσమቁሺ୘ି୲ሻ
σ√୘ି୲  
The comprehensive option value is: 
 ܨ ൌ ଵܲ ∗ ܨଵ ൅ ଶܲ ∗ 0 ൅ ଷܲ ∗ ܨଶ (28) 
whereP1, P2 , P3 is the probability of . 
3.5. Example 
A project company granted the right to develop and operate a road, where the initial investment I is 3 billion RMB and the 
government guarantee is executed annually. Suppose the volatility rate of the project value is 25% and the risk-free interest 
rate is 6%. The government promises that the project company will gain 5% of total annual income as motivation if the annual 
income exceeds 1 billion RMB (ܸܴ0 ൌ 10). The project company will obtain a subsidy to meet its losses if its losses are 
caused by government public welfare policy and the upper limit of subsidy is 2 billion RMB (ܸܴെ ൌ െ20). The government 
will be relieved of its liability if the losses exceed the upper limit. The subsidy from the government is 0 if the income of the 
project company does not exceed 1 billion and there are no losses caused by government public welfare policy. 
The probability of the annual income reaching 1 billion is 25%, the probability of it not exceeding 0.5 billion is 55%, the 
probability of running at a loss because of government public welfare policy is 20% and the maximum loss is 1.5 billion. 
The government guarantee value F gained by the project companyis: 
ܨ ൌ 25% ∗ ܨଵ ൅ 55% ∗ 0 ൅ 20% ∗ ܨଶ ൌ 25% ∗ ܨଵ ൅ 20% ∗ ܨଶ 
whereF1 can be calculated by: 
݀ଵ ൌ
ln ቀെ ୍୚ቁ െ ሺr ൅
σమ
ଶ ሻሺT െ tሻ
σ√T െ t ൌ
ln ቀെ ଷ଴ିଵହቁ െ ሺ6% ൅
଴.ଶହൈ଴.ଶହ
ଶ ሻ
0.25 ൌ 2.4076 
݀ଶ ൌ ݀ଵ ൅ ߪ√ܶ െ ݐ ൌ 2.6576 
݀ଷ ൌ
ln ൬െ ୚∗୍୚౎షమ ൰ െ ሺr ൅
஢మ
ଶ ሻሺT െ tሻ
σ√T െ t ൌ
ln ቀସହ଴ସ଴଴ቁ െ ሺ0.06 ൅
଴.ଶହ∗଴.ଶହ
ଶ ሻ
0.25 ൌ 0.1061 
݀ସ ൌ dଷ ൅ σ√T െ t ൌ 0.3561 
ܨଵ ൌ Ieି୰ሺ୘ି୲ሻሾܰሺdଶሻ െ ሺ VVୖష
ሻି మ౨σమାଵܰሺ݀ସሻሿ ൅ ܸሾܰሺdଵሻ െ ሺ ܸVୖష
ሻି మ౨σమାଵNሺdଷሻሿ 
							ൌ 30 ∗ 0.9418 ∗ ሾ0.996 െ 0.64 ∗ 1.3030ሿ ൅ 15 ∗ ሾ0.992 െ 0.5438 ∗ 1.3030ሿ ൌ 4.5794 ൅ 4.2514 ൌ 8.8308. 
F2 can be calculated as: 
݀ଵ ൌ ݔ√2߬ ൅
1
2 ሺܭ ൅ 1ሻ√2߬ ൌ
݈݊ 10 ൅ ሺݎ ൅ ଵଶ ߪଶሻሺܶ െ ݐሻ
ߪ√ܶ െ ݐ ൌ
2.3026 ൅ 0.3725
0.25 ൌ 10.7 
	Fଶ ൌλVNሺdଵሻ ൌ 0.05 ∗ 10 ∗ 1 ൌ 0.5 
The comprehensive guarantee value F is: 
ܨ ൌ 25% ∗ ܨଵ ൅ 55% ∗ 0 ൅ 20% ∗ ܨଶ ൌ 25% ∗ 0.8308 ൅ 0.5 ∗ 20% ൌ 0.23077	billon	RMB 
4. Discussion 
4.1The option characteristics of the government return guarantee 
An option is a contract that gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying asset or instrument at 
a specified price on or before a specified date. A real option is a non-financial asset that confers the option of making a future 
investment. A real option is an authority to change behaviour with uncertain factors when decision-making, and the authority 
is owned by the project company when it makes long-term investment decisions. From this point of view, a real option is a 
kind of general option (Xiaocheng et al., 2008). The final income of a barrier option depends on not only the price of the 
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underlying assets on expiration but also the changes in price over the life of the option, and is determined by whether or not 
the underlying security’s price passes a certain level before the option can be exercised. Therefore, the barrier option is a form 
of path-dependent option (Gao et al., 2008). The barrier option can be divided into two kinds: the knockout option that is 
extinguished on the price of the underlying asset breaching a barrier; and the knock-in option, that becomes available upon the 
price of the underlying asset breaching a barrier. 
In conditions of uncertain future incomes of the project company, the embedded motivational behaviour government return 
guarantee has the attributes of a knock-in option. When the project company makes a loss due to government policy, the 
government compensates the loss. In this case, the project company actually obtains a knock-in put option that becomes 
available when the project company suffers a loss. When the income of the project company reaches the threshold value set 
by the government, the government will motivate the project company to some extent. In this case, the project company 
obtains a knock-in call option, which becomes available when the income of the project company reaches the threshold value. 
Here, V represents project income, T represents the concession period, VT represents the value of V at the end of the 
concession period, VR0 represents the project income when the income of the project company reaches the threshold value, VR-
represents the maximum compensation that the government can give, and VR ’represents the secondary threshold value. 
Supposing the income of the project company exceeds VR0, the government gives the project company an extra λ (0< λ< tax 
rate) times of actual income as motivation. F represents the embedded motivational behaviour government guarantee value. 
The values of F have a direct relation with VT, as seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. The values of F 
 
When project income is VT< 0 and is caused by government policy, the government will fulfil its responsibility to compensate 
the loss in the range ofห ோܸషห. If the actual income of the project company is 0, then the government guarantee value is -VT. 
When 0 ൑ ்ܸ ൑ ோܸబ , the actual income of the project company is VT, then the government guarantee value is 0. When 
'0 RTR
VVV  , the government motivates the project company with TV , the actual income of the project company is 
TT VV  , and the government guarantee value is TV . When the actual income of the project company exceeds the 
secondary threshold value (்ܸ ൐ ோܸ′), the income that exceeds ோܸ′belongs to the government; therefore, the actual income 
of the project companyis ோܸ′, and the government guarantee value is 0. So, the actual income of the project company is max	ሾ0, ோܸ′ሿ, and the government guarantee value is max	ሾെ ்ܸ, 0, ߣ்ܸ ሿ. 
Therefore, whenVT< 0, the project company obtains a put option whose underlying asset is V and expiration is T.When 
, the project company obtains a call option whose underlying asset is V and expiration is T. 
4.2 Advantages of the method 
1. Avoiding over guarantee 
After analysing more than 1,000 infrastructure concession contracts from 1985 to 2000 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Guasch (2004) found that more than 50% of power projects and 75% water projects were renegotiated. The major reason for 
renegotiations is burdensome debt incurred by the government. Any guarantee promised by ROI is a direct guarantee, with 
explicit financial liabilities for the government. Governments should calculate the precise manpower, material and financial 
resources needed when they decide to make a guarantee. Furthermore, governments should estimate the costs of the guarantee 
and evaluate its value and risks to find a balance between the benefits and risks involved(Griffith-Jones, Ana, 2004; Gong et 
al., 2011). Government guarantees must meet the needs of the market and government financial capacity. It also requires that 
a reasonable guarantee threshold is pre-established. When the project is guaranteed by a floating ROI, although the ROI is 
made quite clear, the final value of the guarantee is directly associated with other factors such as purchases or sales of 
production/service, so its exact value cannot be pre-calculated. Once the government makes a wrong forecast of the future 
market, the government can incur a heavy financial liability (Li, Tao, 2014). This study proposes a new method that abandons 
the minimum ROI by using an exact value from the combined calculations based on different probabilities of different profit 
levels, which provides a quantitative description of the future market uncertainties. Because the guarantee value is made 
clearly, the government can avoid making a guarantee that is beyond its financial capacity.  
2. Avoiding hold-up problems and making responsibilities clear in the government guarantee 
'0 RTR
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When there is a government guarantee for an infrastructure project, the government has an information advantage in the 
project quality requirements, and market demand and private investors have information advantage in capital and technology. 
The government may be locked into an infrastructure project by private investors using opportunistic behaviours to maximise 
their benefits (Tiong, Slum, 1997; Li, Peng, 2013). If the government is locked in, great fiscal subsidies may be generated. 
Although fiscal subsidies are a financial burden on the local economy, the probability of local government cancelling the 
contract is very small (Yang, Liu, 2005). Because of this small probability, the project company has little risk and the situation 
may occur where it is over subsidised by the local government guarantee. The investment decision is partially based on the 
government ROI guarantee and not on any scientific feasibility analysis and ROI forecast. This can cause a high coordination 
cost, low management efficiency and operation profit (Hu, 2007). This study proposes a new method that abandons the ROI 
approach. The project company is unable to hold-up the government without ROI. Another advantage of this method is that it 
clarifies the responsibilities of the local government and project company. Because it has no possibility of holding up the 
government, the project company can only focus on the risks in infrastructure construction, operation and maintenance. The 
government bears the social risk, political risk, legal policy risk and other risks that are not controlled by market behaviour. 
This accords with the principle that risk allocation should be carried out with minimal risk control cost (Ahwireng,  
Mokgohlwa, 2002).  
3. Motivate the project company effectively 
The float ROI guarantee is a limited motivational mode that is most effective only when the expected revenue is between the 
upper limit and lower limits of the investment return. There is no motivational effort at other expected revenue levels, which 
are detrimental for local government (Zhang, Guo, 2009). Viewed from the local government’s standpoint, failed 
infrastructure projects always lead to serious social and political effects. Local government focuses on how to avoid mistakes 
and the failure of infrastructure projects (Salman et al., 2007). These public and socio-economic effects caused by 
infrastructure projects are considered to be concerned with social value (Cheah, Liu, 2006). Viewed from the standpoint of the 
project company, economic value is reflected in the continued cash flow generated by the project. The value of an 
infrastructure project is therefore one of social value and economic value. Local government and private investors have 
different emphases on infrastructure project value that are difficult to balance. The return revenue guarantees provided by the 
local government can increase both economic value and social value, although this additional value is often ignored or 
estimated subjectively (Cheah, Liu, 2009; Chiara, Garvin, 2007). The real option method adopted by this study provides an 
analytic solution that includes this additional value and can motivate investment from private investors (Mason, Baldwin, 
1988; Wang et al., 2006). Furthermore, the proposed method considers the factors affecting the project company’s level of 
effort. If the project company’s return level is more than the secondary threshold, the motivation mode is revenue sharing. In 
this mode, the benefits of private investors and local government are consistent with each other. The more effort made by the 
project company, the more return gained by local government and the project company. The project company will therefore 
do its best to lower the cost coefficient with these sharing rules, as this mode of revenue sharing has proved to be an effective 
motivation mode in the past (Zhang, Guo, 2009). 
4.3 Limitations of the study 
There are two main limitations of this study. The first is how to determine the probability of each return level. The study first 
introduces a combined calculation method based on the probabilities of different project company returns. It can avoid the 
uncertain factors of surrounding future changes in the market and can provide an exact value. The highlighted issue in 
negotiation will transform the approach from one of minimum ROI to the probabilities for each level of return. One way to 
acquire the probabilities needed is in analysing statistical data from similar projects in the same region. Local government has 
an absolute information advantage, which is unfair to private/non-government investors. The second limitation is that it is 
difficult to find practical cases to analyse. This is the first time a method has been presented to determine the government 
guarantee value using probabilities of different levels of return, and therefore there is no historical probability data available. It 
is also difficult to obtain infrastructure information such as guaranteed value and minimum ROI from Chinese local 
governments. According to the Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information 
(State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2007) and Guideline on Carrying out Public-Private-Partnership (National 
Development and Reform Commission of China, 2014), such information is considered to be confidential as the believes its 
disclosure creates a big disadvantage in future negotiations. The study presents a method that will provide an analytic solution 
through strict mathematical derivation that is appropriate for the existing circumstances in China. Future research will be 
aimed at developing the method in the light of the prevailing situation in other countries. 
Conclusions 
This paper proposes a new return guarantee approach with embedded motivational behaviour. ROs theory is used to build an 
option pricing model and the model’s feasibility is verified by an example. This is a theoretical supplement to real option 
theory applied to PPP urban infrastructure procurement. A systematic method is provided to determine the government’s 
guaranteed ROI value, which can provide practical application guidelines for the development of future government policy. 
  
Although the guarantee model proposed does not have the lower limit return guarantee that is always promised in the float 
return guarantee model, it also has no upper limit return and the project company will obtain extra return when the income 
reaches the motivation threshold. This extra return plays an active role in improving the operation performance of the project 
company and therefore improving the efficiency and quality of infrastructure provision. The no lower limit return has a 
positive effect on lessening the financial burden of the government. The government is not responsible for lower limit returns 
and avoids contingent liability. The government only compensates the project company when it makes a loss that is due to 
government policy. The motivation factor has a positive effect on increasing the government’s revenue. When the income of 
the project company reaches the motivational threshold, although the government provides the project company with extra 
income, it also gains tax revenues because of the higher returns of the project company. 
1. The proposed guarantee model has no lower ROI limit. If the government promises a lower ROI limit, there are at 
least two problems: the first is that the government would have a contingent liability; the second is that financial 
pressure on the government may be increased, because if the actual ROI is lower than lower limit, the project 
company will lose their operational incentive. To solve this problem, there is no lower limit of ROI in the embedded 
motivational behaviour government return guarantee model. Because there is no lower ROI limit, the government 
does not need to bear the financial pressure.  However, the government will provide compensation if the project 
company makes a loss due to government policy. 
2. The model sets a threshold value in place of an ROI upper limit. The rational goal of private sector investors is to 
maximise profit and, provided they are legitimate businesspersons and do nothing to harm the public interest, a high-
income level is tolerated in China. If there is an ROI upper limit, the investors only obtain income between the lower 
and upper limits, which restricts the project company’s entrepreneurial operating capabilities and possibly a recourse 
to controlling the actual ROI at or below the upper limit by reducing operating efficiency, affecting the quality of 
urban infrastructure supply. To solve this problem, there is no ROI upper limit in the embedded motivational 
behaviour government return guarantee model. Instead, there is a threshold value such that, when it is exceeded by 
the actual ROI, the project company will not only receive their normal profit but also gain an extra reward. Thus, on 
one hand, the government can obtain revenue from the project income tax at the same time as motivating the project 
company to gain extra income by going beyond the incentive threshold. 
3. To prevent the project company from acquiring huge profits, there is a second threshold value set by the government 
so that, when the actual ROI exceeds this value, the extra income is diverted to the government. Because of the 
public nature of urban infrastructure, however, the probability of the project company obtaining a huge profit is very 
low and so the assumption made here is that the project ROI is always lower than the second threshold. 
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Figure 1. Float return guarantee 
 
  
 
  
Figure 2. Motivation-embedded ROI guarantee 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 The values of F 
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